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States at the Limit: Tracing
Contemporary State-Society
Relations in the Borderlands of
Southeastern Turkey
Leila M. Harris
1 Ali lives in an Arabic speaking village of the Harran plain1 and owns a small plot of land
with his brother (17 decares).2 The brothers recount that they have had difficulty with
weeds this year. Ali suggests that this is due to the fact that they haven’t rotated their
crops.  His  brother  disagrees,  and says  it  is  because the state  subsidy for  pesticides
associated  with  cotton  is  insufficient,  so  they  only  had  enough  money  to  apply
pesticides once. Despite these problems, they consider themselves to have benefited
tremendously from irrigation. ‘With one year’s harvest, I now earn enough to buy a
tractor,’ Ali says, explaining that ‘culture’ and ‘development’ have also come to rural
areas with state irrigation provision.  
2 Amit lives in a Kurdish-speaking village a few miles to the west of Ali. As someone who
does not own land and who had previously been engaged in herding sheep and goats on
the plain, he and his family have very different experiences of irrigation. He explains,
‘It was said that GAP3 is happiness, GAP is survival, but it has been a suicide pill for
those of us engaged in animal husbandry. It prepared our end. Right now, (speaking
about) GAP gives me discomfort.’ Others who had also relied on animal husbandry –
selling  yoghurt,  cheese,  and  animals  for  income,  and  using  wool,  meat,  and  dairy
products for family needs– tell of increasing difficulties in terms of being able to make
ends meet since the coming of widespread canalet irrigation. With fields now dedicated
to irrigated cotton production, there is no longer space available to graze animals.
3 In another nearby Kurdish speaking village, Mufa takes great pride in showing me the
documentation of the state subsidy he will receive for last year’s cotton crop. Although
he only owns 25 decares of his own land, he is entitled to 630 USD of cotton subsidy
(based on 9 cents per kilo of cotton, the subsidy in 2001). This is significant money in a
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plain where average household incomes are estimated as less than $5,000 a year.4 Mufa
believes  that  without  the  subsidy  farmers  would  not  be  able  to  afford  pesticides,
irrigation water, or other expenses associated with cotton, and would likely revert to
growing wheat or other dryland crops. He believes the state must benefit from cotton
production; otherwise they would not pay him to grow it. 
 
I. Towards an Ethnographic Approach to States At
their limits
‘A state exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it
is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life’ (Joseph Strayer, 1970: 5)
4 As suggested by the brief vignettes above, state delivery of irrigation to the Harran
plain in southeastern Turkey over the past decade as part of the large-scale GAP project
has  had  dramatic  and  varied  implications  for  village  life,  crop  selection  and  rural
economies. My purpose here is to read the Turkish state and trace shifting state-society
relations through villager narratives in the Harran plain of the Southeastern Anatolia
region–a  border  region  that  has  been  historically  and  geographically  marginalized
since the initial establishment of the Turkish Republic (see Map 1, below). The time
period under examination is  also  significant  as  the region is  undergoing rapid and
extensive change as part of the large-scale GAP project. Tracing variable responses and
interpretations  of  the ‘state’  in  a  region  experiencing  important  state-led
developmental changes reveals the changing horizontal reach of the state (extending
into regions and spaces where the state previously had little presence) and also shifting
verticality of  the state (providing a sense of  the shifting intensities  of  state-society
interactions  in  the village  spaces  of  this  border  area).  The evidence offered is  also
suggestive of changing state-society relations in ways that are potentially important
for issues of the legitimacy of the Turkish state, and also shifting possibilities related to
the Kurdish question –an especially critical issue given the history and geography of
this region, and lingering conflicts related to separatist movements and the Turkish
state response.
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MAP 1: Southeastern Anatolia
5 While  I  invoke  ‘the  Turkish  state’,  reading  the  state  in  relation  to  rural residents’
narrations is necessarily to also recognize ‘the state’ as a non-distinct, indeterminate
contested sphere. Indeed, insights to be gained from this analysis are due precisely to
the fact that I  investigate and situate the state in relation to its  most unlikely and
contested  ‘sites’  and  articulations  –through  that  of  the  small,  rural,  marginalized,
ethnically  diverse  villages  of  Turkey’s  southeast.  The  extent  to  which  the  state
‘appears’  in  this  region,  and  is  narrated  by  villagers  living  in  this  region,  reveals
something about the degree of success, vertically and horizontally, of state and nation-
building projects in the contemporary moment.
6 My approach to questions of state consolidation, nation-building, and citizenship draws
heavily from a growing body of work on ‘ethnographies of the state’ (e.g. Gupta 1995;
Moore 1993;  Navaro-Yashin 2002;  Secor 2007).  In  brief,  ethnographic  approaches to
states  detail  the  everyday  practices,  encounters,  and  lived  effects  of  the  state.  As
Navaro-Yashin notes, an ethnographic approach to states allows an analysis of ‘people
and the state, not as an opposition, but as the same domain (2)’ (see also Migdal 2001,
2004  for  overview of  state-society  approaches).  My study  builds  on  these  works  in
reading how the state is lived and articulated in everyday life. However, I also extend
these works by picking up on Gupta’s (1995) interest in understanding the ways that
the state is experienced and lived in rural spaces. Pushing this a bit further, I provide
an analysis of evolving state-society relations in spaces that are not only marginal in
terms of their rurality,5 but more centrally, with respect to state and nation-building
projects over time. In the Turkish example, the contemporary southeast is emblematic
in this regard –as a culturally, politically, and economically contested region that has
increasingly frustrated Turkish state and nation-building since the establishment of the
Republic in 1923 (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997; Dahlman 2002; Harris 2002, 2008a). As such,
rural spaces of the southeast can be understood not only as marginal to Turkish state
and nation-building, but also as sites of open contestation. I argue that it is only by
reading the ‘state at its limits’ in those border spaces where Turkish state and nation-
building have often been contested, frustrated, and even overtly challenged (ibid) that
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we can begin to trace and understand both illustrative and exceptional dimensions of
state-society relations and understandings.
7 The analysis provided focuses on the case of irrigation delivery as among the recent
changes that have fundamentally altered everyday village life in the southeast, and,
with it, the ever-dynamic character of state-society encounters.  The reach of the state
is analyzed horizontally, in terms of infiltrating new spaces and life practices, and also
vertically,  in terms of intensified interaction, for instance associated with increased
incorporation of rural residents into the Turkish economy or increased dependence of
villagers on state services. Narratives analyzed include both ways that villagers invoke
the state in relation to questions about irrigation and GAP-related changes, as well as
following questions that directly dealt with the state and villagers’ experiences of state
programs and services.6 Taken together, my aim is to analyze how the state is lived, in
very real terms, in the fabric of everyday village life in the southeast, focusing on the
period  since  the  advent  of  GAP  large-scale  damming  and  water  diversions,  and
highlighting the experience of the Harran plain in particular. As I discuss in the later
sections, ways that villagers narrate these changes sheds light on how the Turkish state
is experienced, and lived, but also necessarily exposes ways that rural residents situate
themselves  as  part  of,  or  in  opposition  to,  larger  economies  and  communities
atregional or global scales (cf.  Appadurai 1996), including in relation to the Turkish
state and nation.
8 With respect  to  broader concerns related to the state,  nation-building,  the Kurdish
question,  or  contemporary change in Turkey,  specific  contributions of  this  analysis
include 1) theoretical contributions in terms of specifying the value of reading state-
society relations ethnographically, and in particular, through a reading that seeks to
understand state-society  encounters  at  the  margins  –in  those  liminal  spaces  where
state  practices  are  less  apparent,  or  may  be  actively  contested.  This  contribution
enriches approaches to the contemporary state, and responds to calls for qualitative
analyses  of  nation-building (Berger  2006)  and for  treatments  of  state  practices  and
national  identity  that  take  seriously  negotiations  of  socio-spatial  difference  (cf.
Radcliffe  &  Westwood  1996;  Craske  2005).  2)  Empirical  contributions  in  terms  of
providing analysis of ways that residents of southeastern Turkey narrate and respond
to Turkish state  practices.  While  there is  a  rich literature on the Kurdish question
generally, or with respect to GAP related development, there is very little that provides
analysis  of  state-society  encounters with  attention  to  narratives  and responses  of
residents living and working the region. As such, by elaborating the ways that the state
is experienced, lived, and narrated in the southeast, this analysis adds significantly to
literatures  on  Turkish  state  and  nation-building  (e.g. Secor  2007;  Kaplan  2006),  on
Kurdish identity and historiography (e.g. Hirschler 2001; Yeğen 1996; Sömer 2004), to
socio-political considerations related to the Southeastern Anatolia project (e.g. Harris
2002; Çarkoğlu & Eder 1998; Öktem 2005; Erhan 1997) or geopolitical considerations
related to the Kurds or the southeast (e.g. Harris 2008a; Gunter 2004; Ergil 2000; Erhan
1997).  Furthermore,  3)  the  paper  is  not  only  of  significance  spatially  (in  the  rural,
ethnically diverse spaces of Turkey’s southeast), but also temporally –through focus on
changes underway as part of widespread irrigation delivery and other state-fostered
changes associated with the GAP project. Finally, 4) as I elaborate in the concluding
section,  the  analysis  is  suggestive  not  only  of  the  changing horizontal  and vertical
reach of the state, but also of shifts in the ways that residents in the region understand
themselves  in  relation  to  broader  notions  of  community.  Along  these  lines,  it  is
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suggested  that  contemporary  state-led  change  in  the  southeast  is  likely  to  hold
symbolic importance precisely given the history of conflictual relations, and specific
discourse related to exclusion of the region invoked in Kurdish separatist discourse. As
such,  the  analysis  holds  promise  with  respect  to  broader  questions  of  citizenship,
democratization, and changing citizen subjectivities.  
9 With respect to method, the examination here draws from field-work conducted in the
Harran plain, the first area to receive irrigation water through GAP. The plain is located
directly north of the border with Syria (see Map 2) and is home to Arabic and Kurdish
speaking minority populations,7 making it both a literal and figurative border of the
reach and extent of Turkish language,  ethnicity,  and state influence.  Narratives are
drawn from interviews with state agents associated with the GAP program, both in
Ankara and Şanlıurfa, as well as over sixty open-ended interviews conducted in the
newly irrigated Harran plain and elsewhere in Southeastern Anatolia in 2001,  2004,
2005, and 2007. A survey of 124 rural households in eleven different villages of the plain
was also carried out cooperatively with a sociologist from Harran University in 2001.8
Admittedly, results from the Harran plain must not be understood as representative for
the entire southeast region, as experiences here necessarily differ from those of other
populations and spaces of the region (particularly given that the plain is dominated by
Arabic  speakers,  and  populations  here  face  issues  very  different  from those  of  the
Kurdish-dominated spaces to the north and east, particularly sites such as Diyarbakir,
or small mountain villages that have been the primary sites of conflict over the past
several decades). In particular, it must be born in mind that the Harran plain stands out
politically from the rest of the southeast region, as an Arabic speaking pocket with
distinctive regional political trends (i.e. that shuns pro-Kurdish politics that might be
popular elsewhere in the region and with tendencies to favor Islamic and even Turkish
nationalist  political  parties).  Nonetheless,  I  ask:  While  the  Turkish  state  has  been
analyzed  ethnographically  in  the  centers  of  Ankara  or  Istanbul  (see  Navaro-Yashin
2002; Secor 2007), or within specificstateinstitutions,9 what is the reach, extent, and
constitution of  the  ‘state’  at  its  margins  –in  the  impoverished,  Arabic  and Kurdish
speaking, rural southeast? Furthermore, how are state-society relations evolving in the
contemporary moment, particularly with regard to irrigation and other recent GAP-
related efforts?
 
States at the Limit: Tracing Contemporary State-Society Relations in the Bord...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
5
MAP 2: Recent Irrigation Projects in Southeastern Turkey: Harran Plain
 
II. Situating state-society relations in a Border Region
10 With even a cursory understanding of Turkish history and politics, the salience of the
southeast, and specifically the rural southeast, as an ‘extreme’ site to investigate the
Turkish  state  should  be  clear.  In  brief,  it  can  be  argued  that  Turkish  modernist
aspirations,  concerns  over  territorial  integrity, and  efforts  to  gain  access  to  the
European Union highlight the southeast region as a central space that is the locus of
these interrelated issues (Harris 2008a). Perhaps with the exception of border disputes
with neighboring Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean sea, the southeastern border with
neighboring Syria and Iraq is  a primary cause of disquiet for those concerned with
solidifying and maintaining the borders and integrity of the ‘Turkish state.’ As the only
majority Kurdish administrative region in contemporary Turkey, southeastern Anatolia
has been the primary site of the decades-long conflict related to Kurdish separatism –
one of  the most  direct  oppositions to  Turkish state  legitimacy and territory in  the
history of the Republic (see Kirşçi & Winrow 1997; Watts 2007; Harris 2002; Dahlman
2002). More recently, the southeast has also been a focal point for rising Islamisms, a
contentious  staging  ground for  US-led  attacks  against  neighboring  Iraq,  the  site  of
continuing skirmishes between Turkish military and separatist  forces,  and a  region
that experiences frequent charges of state corruption and human rights abuses. All of
these issues make the southeast of particular importance for Turkish state and nation-
building,  also serving as  a  locus of  concerns frequently highlighted with respect to
European concerns about possibilities for Turkish accession to the EU (see also Gunter
2004; Ergil 2000).
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11  I highlight the importance of the southeast together with other scholars who argue
that  there  is  theoretical  significance  to  studying  states  and  nations  at  their
metaphorical and literal ‘borders’  (see Jones 2009;  Paasi  2005 and other authors for
recent examples of the growing interest in border studies). As Kaplan et al. assert with
respect to nationalism (1999), there is a lot to be learned by considering borders, those
sites  which  are  simultaneously  both  ‘inside’  and  ‘outside’  the  nation,  revealing
precisely how it is that nation-building processes come undone (or, are also maintained
and consolidated).10 Referring to ‘border’ sites as transgressions that disrupt the very
idea  of  the  nation-state,  these  authors  write,  ‘in  attempting  to  consolidate  its
nationalist power for the well-being of the people, thenation-state often overlooks the
effects its  decisions and consequent events may have on diverse populations whose
difference, often marked through concepts such as sexuality, gender, race, ethnicity,
and class, may situate them adversely to a center’ (Kaplan et al. 1999: 5). Focusing on
the ‘border’  of  the GAP region similarly highlights the betweenness,  indeterminacy,
and double-movements of the Turkish nation and state, simultaneously writing these
peoples and spaces as outside of Turkey, and attempting to incorporate them more
fully into Turkish economies, politics,  and identities (see also Radcliffe & Westwood
1996; Craske 2005; Zurcher 2005 for analyses of nationalism attentive to socio-spatial
difference).
12 Consideration  of  contemporary  state  interactions  and  bordering  processes  in  the
southeast necessarily requires some attention to the history of these issues. While the
map of contemporary Turkey was officially drawn in 1923,11 it wasn’t until the 1940s
and 1950s that the southeastern borders between Turkey and its neighbors were
solidified with the arrival of state agents to police the territorial limit of the Republic.
Prior to that time, residents of the region would pass across the plains into present-day
Syria without concern for official passports, state agents, or internationally recognized
maps of what constituted ‘Turkey’. As Yeğen (1996) has described, the solidification of
the border in southeastern Turkey served to cut off traditional trading routes including
those  that  had  long  been  established  between  Kurdish  areas  in  Turkey  and  those
farther to the south and east.12 In this  sense,  efforts  to create a  ‘Turkish economic
space’ proceeded by marginalizing traditional economic relations and possibilities. In a
similar  fashion,  the  solidification  of  the  official  borders  between the  states  cut  off
transhumance routes of nomadic pastoralists who had traditionally summered in the
high mountains of eastern Turkey and wintered in the plains of Syria. Indeed, many
villages of Turkey’s Harran plain were only established after the formal creation of the
border  between  Turkey  and  Syria.  With  the  formal  establishment  of  the  border,
nomadic  populations  were  systematically  settled  and  animal  husbandry  livelihoods
gave way to settled agriculture.13
13 The relatively recent solidification of the international border is an important issue to
highlight,  both to emphasize state  attempts  to  consolidate  the mapped territory of
Turkey as  distinct  from that  of  its  neighbors and to indicate the consequences the
extension  of  the  Turkish  state  apparatus  throughout  the  border  areas  has  had  for
residents of the southeast. 
14 Throughout Turkish historiography, there has been a great deal of emphasis placed on
demarcating Turkey from its ‘Arab’ neighbors, specifically following the dismantling of
the Ottoman Empire.  As described by Navaro-Yashin (2002:  49) ‘no affinity between
Turkish  and  Arab  cultures  of  the  Middle  East  was  allowed  in  official  accounts  of
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geography and history,’ instead a cultural border between Turkey and the Arab world
was constructed and policed. For instance, schoolbooks were very careful to separate
‘Turks’ from ‘Arabs.’ As she explains, much of this insistence resulted from portrayals
of Arabs as having threatened the integrity of Ottoman rule. Rising Arab nationalisms
explicitly challenged the Islamic Caliphate under the sultan, resulting in portrayals of
Arabs as those who betrayed their Ottoman brothers. Such discourses continue to this
day, deliberately writing the Arab world as outside of and even oppositional to Turkey or
Turkishness,  with  implications  for  Turkey’s  contemporary  regional  geopolitical
affiliations (witness current efforts to gain entry to the European Union or hostilities
between Turkey and Iraq or Syria of the past several decades).
15 Consideration  of  these  nationalist  discourses  is  important  to  situate  the  ways  that
contemporary residents in my study area may understand themselves in relation to the
state. As an isolated ‘Arab’ pocket within Turkish territory the Harran plain is a critical,
and problematic, target of contemporary state interest and intervention with irrigation
delivery  and  the  GAP  project.  With  80-90  percent  of  the  Harran  plain  as  Arabic
speaking,  the plain extends the Arab populations from Syria into Turkish territory,
creating an ethnically  and linguistically  minority  Arab population.The plain is  thus
both the literal border area between Turkey and its Arab neighbors to the south, and
also a site that disrupts those very distinctions, instead demarcating the existence of
‘Turkish Arabs’ within Turkish territory. Thus, the insistence that Turks are distinct
from Arabs that has been so foundational  to Turkish nationalist  discourses exposes
attempts to fix the territorial mapping of Turkey to fundamental challenge, as these
populations are claimed simultaneously as both within and without ‘Turkey’ (cf. Kaplan
et  al. 1999).  Thus,  within the broader context and importance of  the southeast as a
Kurdish site, the peculiar geography of the Harran plain is also important to expose the
limits and tensions inherent to Turkish state and nation-building projects. Attempts to
solidify and fix the border, and to extend the reach of the Turkish state throughout the
southeast, necessarily exposes tensions, fissures, and ambivalences inherent in such a
project (Harris 2008a).14
16  Before turning to contemporary illustrations of changing state-society relations in this
region, it is also necessary to briefly mention other aspects of state-society interactions
in the rural spaces of the southeast,  as well  as to provide some general context on
socio-economic considerations in the region and for the Harran plain.15 In the early
days of the Republic, the Turkish state first demonstrated interest in Anatolian village
life by sending agents to villages in order to discover ‘authentic’ Turkish language and
culture. Over the past several decades, many would characterize the predominant focus
of  state-society  interactions  as  militaristic,  dominated  by  the  Kurdish  conflict,  the
state’s burning and evacuation of villages, limits on assembly and cultural-linguistic
expression, and state-imposed curfew (see Yavuz 2001; White 2001; Mutlu 2001; Kirşçi &
Winrow 1997 for more detail on the Kurdish issue and for understanding of ways in
which this has been a predominant feature of all state-society questions for the region,
and even for Turkey on the whole).  In terms of  state-led developmentalism, recent
state interest in the area has included electricity delivery, drinking water provision,
and more recent interventions related to irrigation, health, and agriculture associated
with  the  large-scale  Southeastern  Anatolia  Project  (GAP)  (see  Ünver  1997a,  1997b;
Carkoğlu & Eder 1998; Erhan 1997; Harris 2002; Akşit 1996, for overviews of the GAP
region, the GAP project, and related socio-cultural considerations). While the bulk of
the  research  discussed  in  this  article  focuses on  irrigation  and  other  GAP-related
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interventions, many villagers in the Harran plain invoke the coming of electricity as an
initial state intervention of great import. They attest that it has only been since the
recent  delivery  of  electricity  that  the  state  has  extended its  reach  and concern  to
include their villages. As such, narratives related to electricity suggest that this made
villagers  feel  as  though  they  were  not  entirely  forgotten  by  the  state,  implicitly
suggesting as well that prior to the 1970s and 1980s, these villagers felt themselves to
be ‘outside’ of state interest and concern. Stronger connections to the Turkish state in
these village spaces were further solidified with the ensuing arrival of television and
telephones throughout the region. Whether watching news of the Turkish parliament,
learning the Turkish language through TV, encountering state agricultural extension
agents on GAP TV,16 or maintaining telephone contact with sons in the military, the
contact zones between the state and rural residents have clearly been extended and
intensified over the past several decades. The empirical material presented below must
necessarily  be  understood  in  relation  to  these  long-standing  state  interventions  in
these rural areas,17 as well as in relation to the ongoing discourses of exclusion and
difference that mark the region as Arab, Kurdish, underdeveloped, or a modern (again,
see Harris 2008a).
17 Part of my argument is that the recent establishment of canalet irrigation up to the
border, but not beyond, is an important recent intervention that marks the boundary
of what lies ‘within’ and ‘without’ modern Turkey, and serves as a recent chapter in the
complex  and  evolving  history  of  state-society  relations  in  this  contested  region.
Turkish state agents are again traveling to small Anatolian villages, this time not to
rediscover  an  authentic  Turkish  past,  but  to  forge  a  modern  Turkish  future.  The
coming of irrigation to the Harran plain required a flurry of activity to prepare the
fields and villagers for what was to come; state agents from DSİ (State Hydraulic Works)
built the canalets, Village Services and other agencies built roads and began ongoing
processes  of  land  leveling  and  drainage  works,  scientists  and  engineers  took
measurements  and  conducted  research,  drinking  wells  were  established,  and
preliminary steps were made to create new management mechanisms in the form of
Water  User  Groups  to  maintain  the  irrigation  infrastructure.  To  prepare  for  water
delivery in  the plain,  state  agents  redistributed agricultural  plots  as  part  of  a  land
consolidation  program  to  make  the  size  and  shape  of  the  plots  more  suitable  for
irrigation. As with the introductory vignettes, I now turn to ways that villagers in the
region narrate irrigation and other recent changes, and what this suggests in terms of
intensified state presence in the daily lives and practices of villagers in the Harran
plain,  and in  turn,  what  this  might suggest  in  terms of  tracing ever-shifting state-
society relations in these marginal and contested rural spaces. 
 
III. Recent Engagements: Shifting State-Society
relations with Irrigation Delivery to the Harran Plain
18 Narratives  offered by villagers  in  the Harran plain  invoke the ‘state’  in  relation to
everything  from  crop  selection  (for  instance  due  to  cotton  subsidies)  to  increased
marginalization of those engaged in animal husbandry (a process that began long ago
with Ottoman and Turkish state sedentarization of nomadic pastoralists). These recent
state irrigation-related interventions in village life –to measure salinity levels, monitor
water usage, test soil quality, or to teach appropriate irrigation techniques– augment
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and intensify long-standing state presence in these rural spaces. With these changes, it
is important to consider how villagers narrate the ‘state’ in relation to these changes,
including their sense of themselves in relation to state agents, interests, and practices.
19 While  interviewing  rural  residents  about  irrigation-related  changes,  villagers  often
stressed  that  state  interest  in  the  region  has  changed.   For  instance,  respondents
remarked ‘at least the state turned its face towards us’, or ‘the state thinks about us
now’. Another said, ‘We did not see any accomplishments of governments in the past,
we are a little bit happy to see some now’. In relaying such sentiments, several credited
recent state attention to the southeast directly to the late leader Turgut Özal.18 One
such  response  was  provided  by  Sübyan,  a  man  who  now  works  as  an  irrigation
technician and who lives in an Arabic speaking village in the central part of the plain. ‘
Sulama [irrigation] has been good. Water brought life here. Özal knows the people of
this region and knew that 90 percent of the 1 million people living here used to go work
as  seasonal  workers,  he  initiated  the  project  andTansu  Çiller  brought  the  water.
Nobody leaves here as seasonal workers now, people in fact come here to work’. 
20 By linking state leaders Özal and Çiller to irrigation and related changes in his village,
Sübyan answers  a  question  related  to  irrigation  with  a  commentary  on  the  ‘state’,
discursively  connecting  the  irrigated  landscape  and  economy  to  state  actors and
interests.  In some senses this is intuitive, as the state is the instigator of irrigation and
advertises all that it is doing for villagers through GAP TV and other means. In another
sense, this connection is striking. Sübyan is providing a reading of the state, and also
state legitimacy, in relation to the changing agro-economy of his village. In so doing, he
allies  himself  with  a  larger  group  of  residents  who  appear  to  welcome  increased
attention and intervention of the ‘state’ in village life. Characterizing himself and his
village as ‘beneficiaries’ of Özal’s vision and Çiller’s implementation, such statements
pose fundamental challenges to simplistic accounts that portray rural residents of the
southeast, or ethnic minorities in particular, as oppositional to encroachments of the
state or modernization efforts –an issue I revisit in the conclusion.19
21 The most common response of villagers of the Harran plain to the question of ‘why did
the  state  bring  irrigation  to  your  village?’  in  our  2001  survey  was  ‘to  benefit  the
farmers’, ‘to benefit the village’, ‘to benefit us’, or some variation. Of 125 respondents,
approximately 76 (60%) noted in their answer that it was in part to benefit the people
or villages of the plain. A proportion of respondents (approximately 30 of 125, or 24%),
noted that the state intends to benefit rural residents, but also ‘itself.’20 As explained by
one villager, the state brought irrigation to the village ‘to have the land worked on, to
benefit the state and the people in the region’. Another young woman noted, ‘First, the
villagers here will gain and then the government will gain. The government is charging
for the water and also getting taxes’. Particular reasons that villagers noted to describe
how the state is likely to also benefit from irrigation include: to develop the region
economically, to generate taxes from increased income, increased productivity (as the
state is the major purchaser of cotton), and from the collection of irrigation fees (which
is  arguable  as  irrigation  water  remains  heavily  subsidized,  in  2001  priced  at
approximately $4 per decare of cotton for an entire season of unlimited water). Others
note additional reasons for delivering irrigation: to reduce unemployment, to induce
farmers to  grow cotton,  to  benefit  the landowners,  to  develop the region and stop
migration to urban areas, this is a reason also cited in GAP planning documents), and
one even noted that state delivery of irrigation is ‘for God’.
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22 While the majority of interviewees perceived state delivery of irrigation as generally
beneficial, at times noting ‘benefits’ also for the state, a smaller subset (approximately
10% of respondents) conveyed negative or skeptical understandings of state irrigation
delivery.  Negative  responses  were  more  likely  among  those  who  had  been  animal
herders prior to canalet irrigation delivery, among the landless,  and among women
(Harris  2008b),21 indicating  that  there  are  some  important  differences  related  to
experiences of these changes among residents of the plain, and among those living in
the southeast region more generally (see also Harris 2006 for discussion of socio-spatial
difference related to GAP changes).  Among more negative respondents,  one villager
repeated back the question to introduce his skeptical response ‘why did the state bring
you water?… The state brought irrigation to its own lands, the state didn’t bring water
to us. We are hand laborers for the state, did they bring it for us? [bize mi getirdi?]’.
Another complained, ‘the country is rich, but the people are poor because the state
keeps  eating  all  the  money’,  referring  to  corruption  and  inequality,  and  echoing
concerns of other villagers who noted that state agents involved in GAP took bribes for
certain  jobs  or  for  land  distribution.  Paralleling  dissatisfaction  with  state  practices
among  some  villagers,  several  GAP-affiliated  employees  also  complained  about  the
‘state’ as overly bureaucratic to the extent that investors pull out of the region, or as
failing to give needed levels of support for engineers and other agents to do their job.
23  Following the question of ‘why did the state bring irrigation to your village?’ we asked
directly whether or not the delivery of irrigation has changed respondents’ attitudes
towards  the  state.22 Again,  responses  varied,  but  generally  villagers  conveyed
increasingly positive associations with the state. ‘We now have a more positive attitude
towards the state because we used to go to places like Adana, but now we are working
on our fields directly in front of our houses’.23 Another noted, our view of the state
‘changed  positively’:  ‘We  had  hatred  before  but  now  they  started  investing  in  the
southeast. The state started to think of us’. Similarly, ‘My positive feelings increased
because we now have electricity, water and are more comfortable’; ‘We did not trust
the state before. But it brought electricity, water, phone etc. to us and now we trust the
state a lot’; or even more forcefully: ‘since the state cares for us, we have become more
devoted to the state’.  Another said it  this  way:  ‘the head of  the household is  more
appreciated if he takes care of his family, we have come to appreciate the state more’. 
24 For these residents, receiving renewed state attention and services has resulted in an
intensified sense of belonging and loyalty as citizen subjects. The characterization of
the state as family by referring to the ‘head of household’ is especially notable, drawing
directly on a notion of the state as a patriarchal unit (as with the term devlet  baba
[father state]) obligated to care for those under his charge and directly linking state
irrigation delivery to nation-building. Such associations have obvious implications for
questions of state legitimacy, related questions of support for Kurdish separatism in the
region, as well as Benedict Anderson’s (1983) question of how people forcefully identify
with a ‘nation’ to the extent that they are willing to offer their lives in its defense. To
varying  degrees,  all  of  these  positive  responses  convey  citizens’  intensified
relationships with the state,  either perceiving themselves increasingly as under the
charge of the state, situating themselves as increasingly ‘devoted’ to the state, or as
beneficiaries of state services. For some of these villagers, irrigation delivery is clearly
creating a field for intensified nationalist association and state consolidation, enabling
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consideration of how it is that states are established and maintained overtime through
specific practices.
25 While such positive characterizations of the state following irrigation delivery were
common,  a  smaller  proportion  of  respondents  noted  increasingly  or  persistently
negative perceptions of the state. Among the more skeptical responses, one noted: ‘My
ideas about the state changed, but not in a positive way –I wish land reform was carried
out’.  Another said, ‘Nothing changed for me but those who are rich became richer’.
Echoing  these  concerns,  another  said:  ‘It  changed  negatively,  because  only  the
landowners benefited from irrigation. The rich are richer, the poor became poorer’.
Similarly highlighting inequalities as a lens through which to understand the state, yet
another said: ‘It brought an increase in welfare of the people. But it did not benefit
everyone because those who did not have land were kept down as workers’. For these
villagers, the differential benefits of irrigation have highlighted and even exacerbated
inequalities  in  the  region,  intensifying  concern  with  respect  to  landholding
differentials and heightening dissatisfaction with the state. Other responses similarly
noted the uneven benefits associated with irrigation, ‘the state didn’t benefit me by
bringing  water,  only  the  landlord’.  A  29  year-old  Kurdish  man  said  it  this  way:
‘Supposedly,  the  state  brought  water  for  improvement  of  people  –to  create  better
economic conditions– but it divided people (into classes). I developed negative feelings
about the state. It has double standards’. As these portrayals suggest, perceptions of
irrigation-related changes vary importantly with respect to landholdings, livelihoods,
and  other  factors.24 The  variability  of  experiences  of  irrigation  conveyed  by  this
diversity of portrayals reflects the ‘situated knowledges’ of residents (Haraway 1991),
demonstrating how landholding or livelihood situations inflect varied perceptions and
understandings of the state.
26 Interestingly, common to all the portrayals, whether positive or negatively inclined, is
the recognition of the state itself as the purveyor of these changes, and by extension,
the state itself as an object of interest and concern (cf. Mitchell 1991, as detailed more
fully  in  Harris,  in  process).  It  is  also of  interest  to  note that  many of  the negative
portrayals do not cast irrigation itself negatively, but instead perceive state failures
with  respect  to  ensuring  that  the  benefits  of  irrigation  are  shared  equitably  or  to
ensure  that  the  benefits  will  last  well  into  the  future  (see  Harris  2009).  For  these
farmers, they may not be opposed to irrigated agriculture, but would only prefer that
more attention be paid to make sure that they too enjoy the benefits associated with
these changes. Among the more negative portrayals that cast irrigation as altogether
detrimental, Amit’s quote prefacing this article names GAP as a ‘suicide pill’ for animal
herders. Others invoked the term ‘slavery’ to express their situation as sharecroppers
falling  increasingly  in  debt.  For  others,  new  visible  markers  of  wealth  among  the
landed,  with  increasing  numbers  of  cell  phones  and  cars,  have  made  them  feel
relatively worse off, heightening a sense of division between the rich and poor, as one
woman said, ‘we have been left more backward’. These views were a minority in terms
of  frequency  of  responses,  but  nonetheless  portrayed profound senses  of  exclusion
from irrigation economies and, by extension, the Turkish nation and state (again, see
analysis in Harris 2009 and 2008b for discussion of overall positive associations with
irrigated  agriculture,  as  well  as  differentiated  experiences  of  these  changes  among
different populations of the region).
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27 Some respondents  also  took the opportunity  to  call  the state  to  task for  perceived
failures in meeting obligations to rural residents in other senses. Referring to the fact
that after irrigation delivery they were expelled from land they rented for twenty-five
years, one rural resident said, ‘we call the state to do its job…we want the state to work
for citizens’. Another woman noted, ‘We want the state to be more interested in the
region,  we  feel  sadness  for  being  forgotten’.  By  intervening  in  village  lives  and
economies, the transition to irrigation has thus also exposed the state to new types of
critique. Most often, the failure of the state to enable the full realization of irrigation’s
potential is noted, ‘because the state couldn’t organize the irrigation fairly therefore
my feelings/thoughts remained the same’. Others echoed the sentiment with respect to
the need for land reform, ‘now we want real land reform’.25 One 25 year old Arabic
speaking woman said it this way: ‘We are unhappy with the system, the government,
their coming and going. We want peace, equality, and most importantly, for the work
done by poor people to be valued’. For her, state irrigation delivery is insignificant as
long as there are other more substantive problems, making recent efforts appear feeble
in the absence of more widespread reform. For these residents and others as noted,
state irrigation delivery highlights other aspects of  services that have not yet been
dealt with, opening the state up to critique as residents sense that they can legitimately
raise further, or more long-standing, demands. Even as such statements suggest that
the state has not yet performed its duties adequately, these narratives are nonetheless
suggestive of a sense of citizenship among these residents. They are, in part, expressing
that  they view themselves  as  citizen-subjects  –able  to  call  on the state  to  meet  its
obligations to them. 
 
Conclusions: Reconsidering State-Society relations in
a Contested Border Region
28 Given the histories of state repression and conflict in the southeast, it is fair to say that
I was expecting much more negativity and distrust towards the ‘state’ than I found.
 Even with some overtly negative and critical responses, the general impression I was
left with after more than 60 open-ended interviews and 124 survey responses is that
many consider that while they had not been well-served by the state previously, they
are  receptive  to  recent  development  efforts  in  many  senses  and  consider  these
interventions  to  be  long  overdue.  Despite  several  possible  issues  that  might  have
resulted in some respondents painting a more favorable impression of the state than
they  otherwise  might,26 the  overall  positive  association  with  irrigation  and  state
intervention in this contested border region nonetheless presents a puzzle, particularly
as other commentators have argued GAP related changes have aggravated volatility in
the region (e.g. Öktem 2005). This issue of receptivity towards the state is also borne out
by earlier research, for instance the survey conducted by Akşit and Akçay in soon to be
irrigated areas  (conducted in  1993,  published in  1997).  While  there  are  remarkable
differences  between  the  1993  results  and  our  own  from  2001,  both  demonstrate  a
strong receptivity on the part of rural residents to enhanced state involvement with
respect  to  water  management.Consider  for  instance,  results  from  the  1993  survey
related  to  the  question  ‘Who  should  own the  water?’  To  this  question,  66%  of
respondents  said  ‘God’,  27.5%  said  ‘the  state’,  3.8%  said  ‘the  user’,  and  2.5%  said
‘society’. When asked ‘who should control the water?’ 80% said ‘the state’, and the other
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20% felt management should be left to the farmers themselves. We repeated these two
questions in our 2001 survey of recently irrigated areas of the Harran plain. We asked,
‘According to you, who should own the water?’. The responses received were 59% of
respondents said ‘the state’, 15% said ‘the farmers’ and 14% said ‘water user groups’.
Not a single respondent said ‘God’ in our survey, while this was the majority response
in the Akşit and Akçay survey, 66% (during open ended interviews, however, ‘God’ was
mentioned on several occasions in response to similar questions).27 To the question of
‘who should manage the water?’ the majority of respondents in the 2001 survey said
‘the  state’  (48%),  while  a  lesser  number  said  ‘Water  User  group’  (36%),  and  only  5
respondents said ‘farmers’ (6%). Regardless of difficulties in comparing the results of
these surveys, it is interesting that for both there are the relatively few respondents
who note that water ownership and management should be in the hands of the farmers
themselves;  instead,  the  ‘state’  is  perceived  as  most  legitimate  in  terms  of  water
ownership and control.
29 I consider such favorable responses to be significant, especially given the contentious
nature  of  contemporary  debates  related  to  Islamism/secularism,  Kurdish  cultural
rights,  or  tensions  related  to  exclusions  of  ‘Arabs’  within  Turkey,  all  of  which  are
particularly salient throughout the southeast.28 Indeed, it is possible that residents of
the region are receptive to the Turkish state’s attention to the region precisely because
the  lack  of  state  investment  historically  has  been  a  primary  discourse  that  the
Kurdistan  Workers  Party  (PKK)  has  invoked  to  garner  support  for  the  separatist
movement (see Mutlu 2001). Given this, the discourse regarding the southeast as having
been left out of state interest and attention is a familiar one, and undoubtedly frames
the  ways  that  villagers  narrate  state  intervention in  their  villages  as  present.  This
might provide a partial answer for why state intervention may be viewed as welcome in
this ‘forgotten’ region (Harris 2008a, 2008b). This possibility points to the potential that
GAP-related changes hold a great deal of symbolic importance, also with considerable
possibilities for recasting state-society relations in this contested border region.
30 While  I  have  argued  that  the  state  is  productively  analyzed  through  narrations  of
villagers living in the marginal spaces of the rural southeast, it is also worthwhile to
reemphasize  that,  at  once,  with  such  invocations  of  the  ‘state’,  villagers  are  also
recasting  and  articulating  themselves  as  subjects  of  nationalist,  statist,  and
modernization  efforts.  Indeed,  as  Sömer  (2004)  has  also  argued  it  is  important  to
consider ways that identities and notions of Kurdishness and Turkishness are cast as
compatible, and may shift over time, in relation to state discourse and policy, rather
than  viewing  such  identities  as  static.  Similarly,  he  also  calls  for  more  work  that
considers the Kurdish question not in relation to cultural rights, or security threat, but
through focus on self conception and political beliefs of Kurds themselves, including
how  these  are  being  continually  reshaped  through  development  processes  in
particular. In case study work described here, there is considerable evidence through
which to consider how elements of statist and nationalist projects take hold among
rural residents, and similarly, how notions of Turkishness, Arabness, or Kurdishness
may be reimagined and recast in relation to ongoing state-society shifts. As such, we
can  begin  to  consider  how  Kurds,  Arabs,  and  others  that  have  been  historically
marginal to Turkish state and nation-building are reimagining themselves, and their
relationship to the state, in the contemporary moment: ‘We are Turkish citizens but the
state exploits  us’,  or ‘the state thinks about the villager’  or ‘I  don’t  think the state
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profits from sulama[irrigation]. The state did land leveling for us. The state thinks about
its  citizens’.  All  such statements simultaneously assess the ‘state’,  and also position
rural residents as ‘citizens’, or even as beneficiaries in relation to such endeavors. In
such examples, even when the ‘state’ is characterized in a negative sense, for instance,
as exploitative, the respondent nevertheless views himself as ‘a citizen of the ‘Turkish’
state’.  Again,  such  associations  are  significant,  especially  when  we  consider  the
histories  of  difference  that  have  persistently  marked  the  region  economically,
culturally, and linguistically. These results can also be read as significant given broader
globalization-related processes underway, as the possibility of intensified associations
with national or state scales necessarily proceed in tension with increasing focus on
supranational, global, or even local scales that are gaining force in the institutional and
governance realms (cf. Appadurai 1996; Agrawal 2005). Along these lines, these results
are also interesting in light of claims made that people’s associations with the nation or
state within which they reside has become increasingly tenuous in a globalized era as
citizens  are  increasingly  connected  to  other  peoples  and  places  beyond  the  state’s
borders,  making the ideal  of  state borders that match up with social  boundaries as
increasingly elusive (Migdal 2004).
31 For rural residents to recognize themselves as Turkish, as recipients of state services,
or, in the case of the one quotation above, as part of a family being cared for by the
state provides testimony to the success (even if limited) of Turkish state and nation-
building efforts. Within the terms of a Turkish state-building project not yet a century
old, irrigation is the latest iteration of practices that further extend the Turkish state
and nation into border regions that have long been contested, and have consistently
foiled  attempts  to  simplistically  mark  the  territory  and  populations  as  singularly
‘Turkish.’ All of this suggests the need to move beyond simplistic associations of the
southeast as ‘Kurdish’ or necessarily oppositional to the Turkish state. Instead, we need
to  consider  the  co-constitution  of  Turkish,  Kurdish,  and  Arab  citizen  subjects,  and
indeed,  the  ways  that  the  Turkish  ‘state’  and  ‘nation’  themselves  are  iteratively
produced, and refashioned in relation to ongoing changes and negotiations.
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NOTES
1.  The  author  wishes  to  acknowledge  tremendous  research  support  from  the  University  of
Wisconsin-Madison, the University of Minnesota, and the American Research Institute in Turkey.
 Nurcan Atalan-Helicke also offered research support for the work presented here. Special thanks
also to Nicole Watts, members of the EJTS editorial board, and several anonymous reviewers for
comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.
2.  One decare is equivalent of one-tenth of a hectare, or 0.2471 acres. 
3.  GAP is the Turkish acronym for the large-scale state development project Güneydoğu Anadolu
Projesi or Southeastern Anatolia Project. The project is extensive, revolving around damming and
diversion  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  rivers  to  pursue  ‘integrated  regional  development’  of
Turkey’s most impoverished region (see Ünver 1997a, 1997b for overview; Harris 2002 ; Öktem
2005 for critical analysis). 
4.  According to Ünver (1997a: 466), prior to irrigation, average family income in the plain was
approximately $1,034 in 1994, and after irrigation delivery in 1995, it rose to closer to $4000.
More recent estimates that take into accounts the effects of the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey
are  not  available.  See  Harris  (2008b)  for  discussion  of  other  changes  that  accompanied  this
increase in average household income (including increasing expenses, increasing debt, and other
related changes).
5.  As  Shankland  (1999)  argues,  it  is  essential  to  attend  to  rural  processes  to  appropriately
understand  questions  of  modernization  and  other  socio-cultural  dynamics  of  importance  in
contemporary Turkey. The analysis here contributes centrally to such a project.
6.  As such, questions were asked directly about the ‘state’ (see footnote 15), but analysis also
includes  the  ways  that  villagers  invoked  the  state  in  relation  to  irrigation  and  GAP-related
changes generally.
7.  Estimates are that approximately 80% of residents in the plain are Arabic speaking and 20%
Kurdish speaking. This refers to primary or familial language spoken, as residents generally also
speak  Turkish.  It  is  problematic  in  some  sense  to  use  native  language  as  a  proxy  for  an
understanding of ‘ethnicity’ (Akşit, 1996), and it is politically contestable to refer to individuals
as either ‘Arab’ or ‘Kurdish’. At times, I reproduce those designations in my analysis, however,
due to the fact that villagers often describe themselves or others as such Arap or Kürt. Some
villagers may, while identifying their family with either of these designations,  also forcefully
associate themselves as Türk. Thus, these categories should not be understood as singular or
finite.
8.  The survey was carried out in 11 different villages of the plain, representing approximately
10%  of  Harran  plain  villages,  and  selected  according  to  location  in  the  plain  (with  villages
selected to provide geographic coverage of all regions of the plain), as well as also representing
different irrigation union districts. Particular villages were selected based on size, from 300 to
800  residents  (making  these  ‘middle’  sized  villages),  and  primary  language  spoken  (nine
predominantly Arabic-speaking villages and two predominantly Kurdish speaking villages were
chosen to maintain the 80% Arabic speaking ratio of the plain). Among survey respondents, 91
States at the Limit: Tracing Contemporary State-Society Relations in the Bord...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
18
were men and 33 were women. For in-depth interviews with villagers, there were approximately
30 male respondents and 30 female respondents. See Harris (2008b) for more in-depth analysis of
survey  results,  particularly  for  discussion  of  differentiated  experiences  of  irrigation  among
residents in the plain relative to gender, ethnicity and landholdings. 
9.  Much  recent  work  on  the  micro-physics  of  state  power  and  distributed  effects  of  state
practices following Foucault has tended to focus on institutions such as prisons or schools (see
Kaplan 2006 for a study of state and nation with respect to the education system in Turkey). As
Navaro-Yashin  argues,  in  addition  to  studying  such  institutions,  there  is  a  need  to  also
understand the ways that the state is invoked and maintained in relation to quotidian practices,
whereby people enact, or critique the state in everyday senses.
10.  In  another  paper,  Harris  2008a,  I  argue  that  the  southeast  is  also  significant  for
understanding Turkish modernization efforts –as both a site of intense interest in overcoming
underdevelopment  and  also  as  a  site  where  certain  key  elements  undermine  modernization
attempts.
11.  With the exception of the Hatay province, annexed from Syria in 1938. 
12.  As described in detail by Yeğen (1996), the solidification of the border areas had important
implications for economies and social interactions throughout the Kurdish areas in Turkey and
surrounding countries. Specifically, as each new state attempted to attain integrated ‘national
economies’ within its own national borders, traditional Kurdish traditional trading routes and
spheres  of  interaction  were  fragmented.  Economic  circulation  between  Damascus,  Baghdad,
Aleppo and elsewhere were cut off to the extent that continued trade across trans-state Kurdish
areas was even criminalized, branded as ‘smuggling’. These processes were among many that led
to  economic  disarticulation  in  the  southeastern  Anatolia  region.  More  recent  geopolitical
tensions,  including  US-led  wars  in  Iraq,  have  continued such processes,  with  many years  of
sanctions that again criminalized trade along routes that had been historically significant for
Kurdish  populations,  including  between  Turkey’s  southeast  and  neighboring  Iraq,  with
considerable economic consequences for Turkey’s southeast region.
13.  The irony of the state arriving one day to establish the border of ‘Turkey’ was the subject of a
film, Propaganda (Çetin & Çetin 1999). In it, villagers who have never had a state ID, let alone a
passport,  are  forced  to  adapt  to  the  arrival  of  border  guards  in  the  middle  of  their  town,
separating friends and families. The mythic town of the film straddling the newly established
border is not unlike the situation that faced villages straddling the border between Turkey and
Syria, with residents of the Harran plan similarly disconnected from families on the other side of
the border in Syria.  As several  farmers explained,  for certain bayram [religious holidays]  the
government  eases  passport  requirements  so  that  they  can  travel  freely  to  visit  friends  and
family. 
14.  To reiterate, I emphasize the southeast as an important border region, and the Harran plain
as a border area within this border region both as significant, but results from Harran cannot be
thought of as representative of the entire southeast region, given political, ethnic, linguistic, and
other differences. 
15.  With respect to other notable characteristics of the Harran plain, it is also noteworthy that
there are high degrees of landlessness in the plain, commonly estimated at approximately 25%
(Ünver 1997a). This percentage was comparable to the overall proportion of survey respondents
who reported that they owned no land. The other general citations provided on the southeast
also provide information on other notable socio-cultural features of the region, including gender
concerns,  the  aşiret  structure,  and  economic  considerations  as  a  region  that  remains
predominantly agricultural and is the site of relatively little economic investment.
16.  The GAP channel is a public relations facet of the GAP project, designed to advertise and
promote GAP development efforts –from agricultural extension to family planning. Based on my
interviews and survey, it is also one of the primary ways that residents are familiar with GAP and
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recognize this as a state program. In the survey, 83 respondents (69%) said they had heard of
GAP, compared to 38 (31%) who said they did not. In a follow up question, we asked what they
think  GAP  does.  Of  responses  given,  thirty  identified  irrigation  and  dam  building,  and  a
considerable number of others identified the television station. Relatively few also associated
GAP with social programs.
17.  Encounters with the state in these villages also necessarily include schoolhouses (the first
place  that  students  may be  required  to  speak  Turkish,  and also  villages  spaces  symbolically
marked  by  the  Turkish  flag  as  a  visible  marker  of  state  and nation)  (see  Kaplan  2006).
Interactions with imams also represent less obvious ‘contact zones’ between villagers and the
state,  as  all  imams  are  state  employees  and  may  often  represent  issues  as  directed  by  the
Directorate  for  Religious  Affairs.  Of  course,  in  other  parts  of  the  southeast,  especially  in
mountainous areas, the ‘village guard’ system represents a very different sort of state presence.
18.  Some argue that Özal’s concern for and interest in the southeast largely stems from his own
Kurdish heritage. Ataman (2002) provides a discussion of the restructuring of Turkish policy vis-
à-vis ethnic minorities under Özal’s leadership.
19.  I do not want to overstate this case, however, given that the Harran plain is both an Arabic
speaking region of the southeast (and thus not necessarily as oppositional as the Kurdish and
mountainous spaces of  the region).  Additionally,  as the pilot area for irrigation delivery,  the
Harran plain is somewhat exceptional as a space that is most likely to have received benefits
from the project (relative to those sites that were inundated to make way for the infrastructure
works, for instance).
20.  This was asked as an unprompted open-ended question, and the response was noted. The
researcher classified the responses based on whether their answers indicated some benefit to
villages  or  the  southeast  region,  and whether  benefits  to  the  state  were  mentioned in  their
responses.
21.  For  instance,  only  one-third  of  self-identified  ‘poor’  women  considered  irrigation  to  be
beneficial, in contrast with approximately ¾ of the entire survey population who noted irrigation
as either being ‘very beneficial’, or ‘beneficial.’ Even as the survey cannot be read as statistically
significant, nonetheless, these sorts of discrepancies pose interesting questions for consideration
in terms of differentiated reception of irrigated-related changes.
22.  The first question asked was ‘Why do you think the state brought irrigation to your village’
(question 30: ‘Size göre, devlet köyünüze sulamayı neden getirdi?’). The follow up question was, ‘Since
irrigation, have your ideas about the state changed? If so, why?’ (question 31: ‘Sulama geldikten
sonra devlet hakkındaki düşünceleriniz değişti mi? Evetse, nasıl?’)
23.  This is an often-celebrated benefit of irrigation delivery, as many villagers used to travel to
Adana for seasonal work as irrigators or cotton pickers. Some villagers still do travel to Adana,
noting better pay, but many stay in Harran due to the proximity.
24.  See  Harris  (2006)  for  discussion  of  how  differentials  with  respect  to  livelihoods  and
landholdings have been retrenched through transition to irrigated economies, and Harris (2008b)
for more general discussion on differentiated effects of, and responses to, GAP-related changes
among women, the landless, Kurds/ Arabs, and others living and working in the region.
25.  In the survey, 72.5% of respondents answered ‘yes’ to the question “in your village, is there a
problem of unequal land ownership?’ Of survey respondents, only 43% said that they owned their
own land.
26.  I  conducted  most  interviews  with  the  help  of  Turkish  assistants.  Students  from a  local
university also helped administer the survey (however, several among these students also spoke
Kurdish and/or Arabic). Throughout the fieldwork, I encountered both very open critique of the
state (perhaps enabled by my position as an independent American researcher, viewed as an
outsider and as potentially sympathetic to such critique, especially related to the Kurdish issue)
and also obvious caution and skepticism as to the purpose and goals of the research (for instance,
States at the Limit: Tracing Contemporary State-Society Relations in the Bord...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
20
with questions as to whether I was being sent there by the state, and so forth, although such
skepticism and distrust was relatively rare).
27.  One should not read too much into this comparison, as we do not have adequate details
about the sample of the earlier surveys or the way that the earlier survey was implemented
(although the earlier survey was also among villages of  the Harran plain,  and several  of  our
villages overlapped). In terms of this particular discrepancy in responses, a possible explanation
is that the earlier surveyors likely provided choices to respondents (upon hearing ‘God’, it would
be less likely for respondents to provide some other answer), while our survey was asked in a way
that left all responses open-ended (responses were only later grouped and categorized).
28.  Villages of the region are generally portrayed as highly Islamic, and the region generally
often supports Islamist or Kurdish political parties.
RÉSUMÉS
There is theoretical significance to studying states and nations at their metaphorical and literal
‘borders’.  Focusing  on  the  contested  border  region  of  southeastern  Anatolia,  this  chapter
highlights the tensions, contradictions, and recent shifts in state-society relations in the rural
spaces of the southeast. As I detail, state delivery of irrigated agriculture represents a recent and
significant chapter in the evolving state-society relations in this contested border area. With
contemporary changes associated with the large-scale Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), state
influence in rural areas and encounters with the state by rural populations are intensified. This
occurs  both  horizontally,  in  terms  of  infiltrating  new  spaces  and  life  practices,  and  also
vertically,  in  terms  of  intensified  interaction,  such  as  that  associated  with  the  increased
incorporation  of  rural  residents  into  the  Turkish  economy  or  the  increased  dependence  of
villagers  on  state  services.  Reading  the  state  ethnographically  through  the  differentiated
responses of villagers to recent irrigation-related changes, my aim is to analyze how the state is
lived, in very real terms, in the fabric of everyday life, and to consider what this suggests for
understanding state-society relations and the changing citizen subjectivities in the liminal spaces
of Turkey’s southeast.
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